RSVP transmits packets using raw IP, which does not ensure security. In raw IP, packets are easily tampered with, and devices can be easily attacked. Digests of RSVP messages are verified to protect them from being tampered with and forgery attacks, enhancing network reliability and security.
Basic principles
The same key must be configured on both nodes involved in authentication. When sending a packet, a node generates a digest using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm based on a configured key. The digest is carried in the packet as an integrity object to the peer node. The peer node generates a digest using the same algorithm based on the configured key and compares the two digests. If the two digests are the same, it accepts the packet; otherwise, it discards the packet. RSVP authentication, however, cannot prevent replay attacks or handle neighbor relationship termination problems resulting from out-of-sequence RSVP messages. To resolve these issues, RSVP authentication extensions are used. RSVP authentication extensions include the authentication lifetime, authentication handshake mechanism, and sliding window mechanism, in addition to the original authentication mechanism. They can improve RSVP security and enhance user authentication in adverse network environments, such as congested networks.
HMAC-MD5 authentication provides low security. To ensure high security, you are advised to use keychain authentication and a high-security algorithm, such as HMAC-SHA-256.
HMAC-MD5
Users can enter simple text or ciphertext keys on RSVP interfaces and neighbors. The key algorithm is HMAC-MD5. The features of this mode are as follows:
1. A unique key must be configured for each feature, and the key cannot be shared.
2. An interface or a neighbor can be configured with only one key. To change the key, reconfigure it.
Keychain
A keychain is an enhanced encryption algorithm. It allows users to define a group of passwords as a password string. An encryption/decryption algorithm and a validity period are defined for each password. The system selects a valid password, encrypts packets before sending them, and decrypts packets when receiving them using the encryption/decryption algorithm matching the selected password. In addition, the system can automatically use a new password after the previous password expires, preventing the password from being decrypted.
The features of this mode are as follows:
In RSVP, a keychain can be referenced on interfaces or neighbors.
RSVP authentication modes
RSVP supports two authentication modes:
Neighbor-oriented authentication
In this mode, you can configure authentication information, such as authentication keys based on different neighbor addresses. RSVP then authenticates each neighbor.
Neighbor-oriented authentication can be configured in either of the following ways:
1. Configured based on an interface IP address of a neighbor.
2. Configured based on the LSR ID of a neighbor.
Interface-oriented authentication
The most common attacks and prevention methods are as follows:
Replay attacks
When processing packets, RSVP checks various information, including parameters, formats, and types. The information can be easily obtained by attackers. Therefore, attackers can illegally obtain RSVP packets and repeatedly send packets to the device to increase the load of the device. Object verification is added to RSVP messages to protect the messages from being tampered with and forgery attacks, enhancing network reliability and security.
Error packet attacks
Attackers construct various types of error packets, such as super long packets, packets with incorrect headers, packets of incorrect lengths, and packets with invalid next hops, to initiate attacks. RSVP uses strict rules for outgoing packets. It discards error packets without ending neighbor relationships, ensuring service continuity. It does not accept or advertise packets with serious errors, such as extremely long packets or invalid packet types.
When no CR-LSP is reachable between RSVP neighbors, they can keep the neighbor relationship until the configured TTL of RSVP authentication elapses. The configured TTL of RSVP authentication does not affect existing CR-LSPs.
The handshake function helps RSVP key authentication prevent replay attacks.
If the handshake function is configured between neighbors and the lifetime is configured, the lifetime must be greater than the interval at which RSVP update messages are sent. If the lifetime is smaller than the interval at which RSVP update messages are sent, authentication relationships may be deleted because no RSVP update message is received within the lifetime. As a result, the handshake mechanism is used again when a new update message is received. An RSVP-TE tunnel may be deleted or fail to be established.
The message window function prevents RSVP message mis-sequence.
If the window size is greater than 1, the local device stores several latest valid sequence numbers.